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Abstract
Deepfakes are a recent off-the-shelf manipulation tech-
nique that allows anyone to swap two identities in a sin-
gle video. In addition to Deepfakes, a variety of GAN-
based face swapping methods have also been published
with accompanying code. To counter this emerging threat,
we have constructed an extremely large face swap video
dataset to enable the training of detection models, and or-
ganized the accompanying DeepFake Detection Challenge
(DFDC) Kaggle competition. Importantly, all recorded sub-
jects agreed to participate in and have their likenesses mod-
ified during the construction of the face-swapped dataset.
The DFDC dataset is by far the largest currently-
and publicly-available face swap video dataset, with over
100,000 total clips sourced from 3,426 paid actors, pro-
duced with several Deepfake, GAN-based, and non-learned
methods. In addition to describing the methods used to con-
struct the dataset, we provide a detailed analysis of the top
submissions from the Kaggle contest. We show although
Deepfake detection is extremely difficult and still an un-
solved problem, a Deepfake detection model trained only on
the DFDC can generalize to real ”in-the-wild” Deepfake
videos, and such a model can be a valuable analysis tool
when analyzing potentially Deepfaked videos. Training,
validation and testing corpuses can be downloaded from
http://ai.facebook.com (URL to be updated).
1. Introduction
Swapping faces in photographs has a long history, span-
ning over one hundred and fifty years [7], as film and digital
imagery have a powerful effect on both individuals and so-
cietal discourse [15]. Previously, creating fake but convinc-
ing images or video tampering required specialized knowl-
edge or expensive computing resources [27]. More recently,
a new technology called Deepfakes1 has emerged [29] -
a technology that can produce extremely convincing face-
swapped videos. Producing a Deepfake does not require
specialized hardware beyond a consumer-grade GPU, and
several off-the-shelf software packages for creating Deep-
fakes have been released. The combination of these factors
has lead to an explosion in their popularity, both in terms of
producing parody videos for entertainment, and for use in
targeted attacks against individuals or institutions [9].
With the understanding that it is now possible for a mem-
ber of the general public to automatically create convinc-
ing fake face-swapped videos with simple hardware, the
need for creating automated detection methods becomes
clear [2]. While digital forensics experts can analyze sin-
gle, high-impact videos for evidence of manipulation, this
1The term ”Deepfake” has multiple definitions, but we define a Deep-
fake as a video containing a swapped face and produced with a deep neural
network. This is constrasted with so-called ”cheapfakes” - if a fake video
was produced with machine learning, it is a Deepfake, whereas if it was
created with widely-available software with no learning component, it is a
cheapfake [21].
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cannot scale to reviewing each of the hundreds of thousands
of videos uploaded to Internet or social media platforms ev-
ery day. Detecting Deepfakes at scale necessitates scalable
methods, and computer vision or multimodal models are
particularly suited to this challenge. However, these models
require training data, and even though it is possible to cre-
ate several convincing Deepfakes easily, the cost of produc-
ing the hundreds of thousands of Deepfake videos neces-
sary to train these models is often cost prohibitive. In order
to accelerate advancements in the state of the art of Deep-
fake detection, we have constructed and publicly released
the largest Deepfake detection dataset to date.
Our first major contribution is the DeepFake Detection
Challenge (DFDC) Dataset. Motivated primarily by the
fact that many previously-released datasets contained few
videos with few subjects and with a limited size and number
of methods represented, we wanted to release a dataset with
a large number of clips, of varying quality, and with a good
representation of current state of the art face swap methods.
Furthermore, as we observed that many publicly-released
datasets [14, 17, 18, 23, 30] did not guarantee that their sub-
jects were willing participants or agreed to have their faces
modified, we solicited video data from 3,426 paid actors
and actresses speaking in a variety of settings for roughly 15
minutes each. All participants agreed to appear in a dataset
where their faces may be manipulated by a computer vision
algorithm. The DFDC Dataset is both the largest currently-
available Deepfake dataset, and one of only a handful of
datasets containing footage recorded specifically for use in
machine learning tasks (the others being the much smaller
Google Deepfake Detection Dataset [6] and the preview
version of this dataset [5]).
Beyond building and releasing a dataset, our second ma-
jor contribution is a now-completed benchmark competition
using this data2, and the resulting analysis. The benefits of
a competition of this size are many. First, the monetary
prizes provided a large incentive for experts in computer
vision or Deepfake detection to dedicate time and computa-
tional resources to train models for benchmarking. Second,
hosting a public competition obviates the need for the au-
thors of a paper to train and test a model on a dataset they
produced. Releasing a dataset and a benchmark simultane-
ously can introduce bias, as the creators of a dataset have
intimate knowledge of what methods were used while con-
structing the dataset. Third, gathering thousands of submis-
sions and running them against real Deepfake videos that
participants never see paints an extremely accurate picture
of the true Deepfake detection state of the art.
Figure 1: Comparison of current Deepfake datasets. Both
axes are shown in log scale - the DFDC is over an or-
der of magnitude larger than any other available dataset,
both in terms of the number of frames and number of
videos. Rough boundaries for dataset ”generation” (as
given in [18]) also shown. Overlapping circles do not in-
dicate inclusion; circle sizes are merely a visualization of
the number of fake identities present in the dataset.
2. Previous work
Due to the nature of the pairwise auto-encoder style
model used to produce the majority of Deepfake videos,
and due to limited availability of source footage, previous
datasets contain few videos and fewer subjects. Specifically,
every pairwise swap between two identities requires retrain-
ing a single model, which in modern hardware takes about
one day on a single GPU. However, as noted in [23], the
scale of a dataset in terms of raw training videos or frames
is critical to a detector’s performance.
Li et al. [18] break down previous datasets into two
broad categories - first generation datasets such as DF-
TIMIT [17], UADFV [30], and FaceForensics++ DF (FF++
DF) [23], and the second generation, containing datasets
such as the Google DeepFake Detection Dataset [6], Celeb-
DF [18], and the DFDC Preview Dataset [5]. In general,
each generation improves over the previous one by increas-
ing the number of frames or videos by an order of magni-
tude. However, the datasets in the first two generations all
suffer from a small number of swapped identities, which
can contribute to overfitting on those particular identities.
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/deepfake-detection-challenge
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Table 1: Quantitative comparison of various Deepfake datasets
Dataset
Unique
fake videos
Total
videos
Unclear
rights
Agreeing
subjectsa
Total
subjects Methods No. perturb.
No.
benchmarksb
DF-TIMIT [17] 640 960 5 0 43 2 - 4
UADFV [30] 49 98 5 0 49 1 - 6
FF++ DF [23] 4,000 5,000 5 0 ? 4 2 19
Google DFD [6] 3,000 3,000 3 28 28 1 - -
Celeb-DF [18] 5,639 6,229 5 0 59 1 - -
DeeperForensics-1.0 [14] 1,000 60,000 5 100 100 1 7c 5
DFDC Preview[5] 5,244 5,244 3 66 66 2 3 3
DFDC 104,500 128,154 3 960 960 8d 19 2,116
a The number of subjects who agreed to usage of their images and videos.
b The number of publicly-available benchmark scores, from unique models or individuals. Due to the difficulty in finding all uses of a dataset, the
scores must be in a centrally-located place (e.g. a paper or leaderboard).
c The DF-1.0 paper counts different perturbation parameters as unique. Our augmentations take real number ranges, making this number essentially
infinite, so we only count unique augmentations, regardless of parameters.
d Different methods can be combined with other methods; for simplicity our 8 methods are DF-128, DF-256, MM/NN, NTH, FSGAN, StyleGAN,
refinement, and audio swaps.
In all cases, apart from (possibly) FF++ DF, there are fewer
than 100 unique identities. The FF++ DF dataset indexes
by video sequence rather than ID, so it is unclear how many
unique IDs appear in the dataset.
Finally, we propose a third generation of datasets that not
only have more than an order of magnitude larger number
of frames and videos than the second generation, and with
better quality, but also with agreement from individuals ap-
pearing in the dataset. This generation would include the
DFDC, as well as the recent DeeperForensics-1.0 (DF-1.0)
dataset [14]. We believe that future face-swapped datasets
should seek agreement from individual participants in order
to be useful to and ethical for the research community.
First generation: Datasets in this generation usually
contain less than 1,000 videos and less than 1 million
frames. In addition, these datasets generally do not rep-
resent that they have the rights to the underlying content or
agreement from individuals in the dataset. UADFV, DF-
TIMIT, FaceForensics++ all contain videos sourced from
YouTube and perform face swaps between public individu-
als. Additionally, due to the small scale, models trained on
datasets such as FaceForensics++ usually do not generalize
to real Deepfake videos [19].
Second generation: These datasets generally contain
between 1 and 10 thousand videos and 1 and 10 million
frames, and contain videos with better perceptual quality
than videos in the first generation. The Celeb-DF dataset
contains over an order of magnitude more data than previ-
ous datasets, but contains data with use restrictions. During
this generation, ethical concerns of subjects appearing in a
dataset without their consent were publicly raised [26]. As
a response, the preview version of this dataset, with con-
senting actors, was released. Shortly thereafter, the similar
Google-DFD Dataset was also released, and also contained
28 paid actors. However, the datasets in this generation also
do not contain enough identities that allow for sufficient de-
tection generalization.
Third generation: The most recent DeepFake datasets,
DeeperForensics-1.0 and the DFDC Dataset, contain tens of
thousands of videos and tens of millions of frames. The en-
couraging trend of using paid actors has continued for both
of these datasets. However, there are many major differ-
ences between DF-1.0 and the DFDC Dataset, and as DF-
1.0 is the most similar dataset to the DFDC dataset, they are
covered in detail.
First, although it is claimed that all videos in DF-1.0 con-
tain consenting individuals, the target videos in the released
dataset are all sourced from the internet, and whether these
videos can be used freely is unclear. In addition, we do not
count a fake video and the same fake video with a pertur-
bation as two separate fake videos, as is done in DF-1.0, as
these perturbations are trivial to add and do not require large
scale computing resources. Every one of the 100,000 fake
videos in the DFDC Dataset is a unique target/source swap.
Ignoring perturbations, DF-1.0 only contains 1,000 unique
fake videos.
Furthermore, there are several notable differences be-
sides raw numbers that have implications for the general-
ization performance of models trained on these datasets.
The first is in the nature of the source data. DeeperForen-
sics contains videos recorded in a controlled, studio setting,
while the DFDC Dataset contains videos of individuals in
indoor and outdoor settings, in a variety of real-world light-
ing conditions. The methods used to generate our dataset
are flexible enough to handle this variety, and do not require
frontally-captured videos taken in a studio. In addition, the
DF-1.0 training dataset only contains videos produced by a
single model that is proposed by the authors (and thus has
not been used to create any public Deepfake videos), limit-
ing the applicability of training on this set.
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Finally, in order to avoid the bias introduced by knowing
how our manipulated data was produced, we do not pro-
pose any detection model trained specifically on our data,
and instead solicited the community to contribute models
that run on a hidden test set. Therefore, we constructed
both a public test set (containing 4,000 videos) and a pri-
vate test set (containing 10,000 videos), and included real
”in-the-wild” Deepfakes. DF-1.0 uses a hidden test set of
400 videos, but it is not clear how many are real or fake or
even whether or not they are Deepfaked videos. Finally, the
perturbations used in DF-1.0 to expand the original set of
1,000 fake videos only contain basic pixel-level distortions
such as color changes and Gaussian noise, and no semantic
distractors that are present in real videos.
3. DFDC Dataset
3.1. Source data
Many Deepfake or face swap datasets consist of footage
taken in non-natural settings, such as news or briefing
rooms. More worryingly, the subjects in these videos may
not agreed to have their faces manipulated.
With this understanding, we did not construct our dataset
from publicly-available videos. Instead, we commissioned
a set of videos to be taken of individuals who agreed to be
filmed, to appear in a machine learning dataset, and to have
their face images manipulated by machine learning mod-
els. In order to reflect the potential harm of Deepfaked
videos designed to harm a single, possibly non-public per-
son, videos were shot in a variety of natural settings without
professional lighting or makeup, (but with high-resolution
cameras, as resolution can be easily downgraded). The
source data consisted of:
1. 3,426 subjects in total with an average of 14.4 videos
each, with most videos shot in 1080p
2. 48,190 total videos that average 68.8s each - a total of
38.4 days of footage
3. Over 25 TB of raw data
The source videos were pre-processed with an internal
face tracking and alignment algorithm, and all face frames
were cropped, aligned, and resized to 256x256 pixels. For
Deepfake methods, a subsample of 5,000 face frames col-
lected from all videos was used to train models.
3.2. Methods
Throughout this section, the terms target and source are
used. In general, target refers to the base video in which
a face will be swapped; source refers to the source content
that is used to extract the identity that will be swapped onto
the target video. For example, for face swapping, we wish to
put the source face onto the target face, resulting in a video
identical to the target video, but with the source identity.
All of the face-swapped videos in the dataset were cre-
ated with one of N methods. The set of models selected
were designed to cover some of the most popular face swap-
ping methods at the time the dataset was created. In addi-
tion, some methods with less-realistic results were included
in order to represent low-effort Deepfakes. The number
of videos per-method are not equal; the majority of face-
swapped videos were created with the Deepfake Autoen-
coder (DFAE). This choice was made as to reflect the distri-
bution of public Deepfaked videos, which are usually cre-
ated with off-the-shelf software like DeepFaceLab3 or other
public repositories used for creating Deepfakes. For a full
description of each model’s architecture, please refer to the
Appendix.
DFAE: The DFAE model does not have a consistent
name or design in public versions, but it is generally struc-
tured like a typical convolutional autoencoder model with
several small but important differences. First, the model
uses one shared encoder, but two separately-trained de-
coders, one for each identity in the swap. Additionally,
the shared portion of the encoder extends one layer beyond
the bottleneck, and the upscaling functions used are typi-
cally PixelShuffle operators, which is a non-standard, non-
learned function that maps channels in one layer to spatial
dimensions in the next layer. This architecture encourages
the encoder to learn common features across both identities
(like lighting and pose), while each decoder learns identity-
specific features. At inference time, a given input identity in
a frame is run through the opposite decoder, thus producing
a realistic swap. The model is flexible; in the DFDC dataset,
we included models that used an input/output resolution of
128x128 and 256x256. All of the images in the banner are
fake faces, produced by a DFAE at 128x128 input/output
resolution.
MM/NN face swap: The next method performed swaps
with a custom frame-based morphable-mask model. Facial
landmarks in the target image and source image are com-
puted, and the pixels from the source image are morphed to
match the landmarks in the target image using the method
described in [13]. The eyes and the mouth are copied from
the original videos using blending techniques, and spher-
ical harmonics are used to transfer the illumination. This
method works best when both the target and source face ex-
pressions are similar, so we used a nearest-neighbors ap-
proach on the frame landmarks in order to find the best
source/target face pair. In a video, this approach is imme-
diately evident, but on a frame-per-frame basis, the results
look more realistic and could fool detectors that only oper-
ate on individual frames.
3https://github.com/iperov/DeepFaceLab
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Figure 2: The fake faces in the top row were post-processed
with a sharpening filter, resulting in the images in the bot-
tom row.
We included three additional models based on methods
that incorporate GANs - the Neural Talking Heads (NTH)
model, FSGAN, and a method utilizing StyleGAN.
NTH: The NTH [31] model is able to generate realis-
tic talking heads of people in few- and one-shot learning
settings. It consists of two distinct training stages: a meta-
learning stage and a fine-tuning stage. In the meta-learning
stage, the model learns meta-parameters by transforming
landmark positions into realistic-looking talking heads with
a handful of training images of that person. In the fine
tuning stage, both the generator and the discriminator are
initialized with meta-parameters and quick coverage to the
state that generate realistic and personalized images after
seeing a couple of images of a new person.
A pre-trained model is fine-tuned with pairs of videos in
the raw DFDC set: the land marking positions are extracted
from the driving video and fed into the generator to produce
images with the appearance of the person in the other video.
FSGAN: The FSGAN method (fully described in [20])
uses GANs to perform face swapping (and reenactment) of
a source identity onto a target video, accounting for pose
and expression variations. FSGAN applies an adversar-
ial loss to generators for reenactment and inpainting, and
trains additional generators for face segmentation and Pois-
son blending. For the DFDC, we generated FSGAN swap
videos using generator checkpoints trained on the data de-
scribed in [20], after performing brief fine-tuning on the
reenactment generator for each source identity.
StyleGAN: The StyleGAN [16] method is modified to
produce a face swap between a given fixed identity descrip-
tor onto a video by projecting this descriptor on the latent
face space. This process is executed for every frame.
Refinement: Finally, a random selection of videos went
through post processing. Using a simple sharpening filter on
the blended faces greatly increased the perceptual quality in
the final video with nearly no additional cost, as shown in
Figure 2.
3.2.1 Audio
In addition to these face-swapping methods, we also per-
formed audio swapping on some video clips using the TTS
Skins voice conversion method detailed in [22]. Video clips
were selected for audio swapping independent of whether
they were Deepfakes, or which face-swapping method was
used. The voice identity used to swap did not depend on the
face identity used in a swap. Although these audio manip-
ulations were not considered ’Deepfakes’ for the competi-
tion, we included them in the set to provide more breadth
of manipulation type, and they may be of use in further re-
search.
3.3. Training
All subjects were split into one of four sets: training,
validation, public test, or private test. The training and vali-
dation sets were released publicly, while the public and pri-
vate test sets were not released, as they were used to rank
the final scores of all submissions to the Kaggle contest.
Not all possible pairs were trained. For example, an ini-
tial set of 857 subjects were selected into the training set,
and there are over 360,000 potential pairings within this
group. Training all pairs would require almost 1,000 GPU-
years, assuming that it takes one day to train a DFAE model
on one GPU. Instead, within a set, subjects were paired
with those with similar appearances, as this tended to give
better results for models like the DFAE. Over 800 GPUs
were used to train 6,683 pairwise models (which required
18 GPU-years), as well the more flexible models such as
NTH or FSGAN that only required a small amount of fine-
tuning per subject. Finally, a subset of 10 second clips were
selected from the output of all models, and the overall dis-
tribution of gender and appearance was balanced across all
sets and videos.
3.4. Post processing
After inference, all methods produced a cropped image
containing the face at 256x256 resolution. However, some
methods do not infer details around the face, such as hair
or background information. Therefore, we re-blended the
face onto the original full-resolution raw frame using sev-
eral steps, and combined the original raw frames and audio
with ffmpeg.
First, we created a face mask using detected landmarks.
The mask produced by these landmarks included the fore-
head region - many off-the-shelf algorithms only use a mask
that extends to the eyebrow region, but this can lead to
blending artifacts where ”double eyebrows” appear in the
final video. Next, we blended the face using the mask onto
the original frame using Poisson blending. However, we did
not use Poisson blending over the entire mask, as this would
often blend the two identities and create an ”average” face
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rather than a face that looks like the source subject. Instead,
we only blended a small region along the edges of the mask.
Practically, this was done using a set of morphological oper-
ations that extracted the mask border, applying a Gaussian
filter to the mask border pixels, and finally Poisson blending
the original and swapped face frames using this transformed
mask.
Finally, it is important to note that proper face align-
ment enhanced the quality of all methods. Having each face
aligned at a similar scale allowed models to focus on the de-
tails of a face, rather than having to rotate or translate mis-
aligned faces. In addition, consistent alignment reduced
face jitter in the final videos, which is usually a telltale sign
that a video was Deepfaked. Faces were aligned by using a
triangular set of positions formed by the two eyes and the
nose, and computing an affine transform that best aligned a
given face with these positions.
3.5. Dataset contents
Training set: The training set provided was comprised
of 119,154 ten second video clips containing 486 unique
subjects. Of the total amount of videos, 100,000 clips con-
tained Deepfakes which translates to approximately 83.9%
of the dataset being synthetic videos. In order to create the
Deepfakes, the DFAE, MM/NN face swap, NTH, and FS-
GAN methods were used. No augmentations were applied
to these videos.
Validation: The validation set is the public test set used
to compute the public leaderboard positions in the Kaggle
competition. This dataset consisted of 4,000 ten second
video clips, in which 50% (2000 clips) included Deepfakes.
214 unique subjects were used, none of which were a part
of the training set. Additionally, the dataset included one
unseen generation method for Deepfakes: StyleGAN. Aug-
mentations were applied to roughly 79% of all videos.
Test: The private test set used was comprised of 10,000
ten second clips. Similar to the public test set, 50% of
the clips included Deepfakes and the other 50% were non-
Deepfaked clips. However, unlike the public test set, 50%
of this dataset includes organic content found on the internet
and the other 50% is unseen content from our source video
dataset, collected from various sources. We are releasing
the DFDC-like data portion from the private test set as the
final test set.
The half of the final evaluation test set consisting of
DFDC videos was assembled using 260 unique subjects
from the source video dataset that have not been seen be-
fore. The data was constructed identically to our public test
set, including all listed model types except for StyleGAN.
Augmentations were applied to approximately 79% of all
videos in the final evaluation test set. New, never-before-
seen augmentations were applied including a dog mask and
a flower crown filter.
Training, validation and testing corpuses can be down-
loaded from http://ai.facebook.com (URL to be
updated).
3.6. Augmentations
Various augmentations such as geometric transforms or
distractors were added to the videos in both the public Kag-
gle test set as well as the final evaluation test set. We defined
two overarching types of augmentations:
1. Distractor: overlays various kinds of objects (includ-
ing images, shapes, and text) onto a video
2. Augmenter: applies geometric and color transforms,
frame rate changes, etc. onto a video
Augmenters were randomly applied to approximately
70% of the videos and are fairly straightforward trans-
forms. The following types of augmenters were applied,
all at randomly chosen levels: Gaussian blurring, bright-
ening/darkening, adding contrast, altering the framerate,
converting to grayscale, horizontal flipping, audio removal,
adding noise, altering the encoding quality, altering the res-
olution, and rotating. All augmenters were present in both
the public and final test sets, except for the grayscale aug-
menter which was only present in the final evaluation test
set.
About 30% of all videos contained distractors, some be-
ing more adversarial than others. The simplest distractors
overlay random text, shapes, and dots onto each frame of
a video and move around frame to frame. There can either
be consistent movement (i.e. moving across horizontally or
vertically) or random movement. The next subset of dis-
tractors overlay images onto each frame of a video. Similar
to the previous subset, there can either be consistent or ran-
dom movement. Additionally, there is an option to have the
same image moving around the entire video, or the option to
choose a random image every frame. Some of the added im-
ages included faces from the DFDC dataset. The last subset
of distractors are facial filters that are commonly used on
social media platforms. The facial filters implemented were
the dog and flower crown filters.
All distractors were present in the final evaluation test
set, however only the text, shapes, and faces distractors
were present in the public Kaggle test set. The Deepfake
YouTube channels logo distractor was only applied to be-
nign videos in order to detect if any models were overfitting
to YouTube data, which was not allowed by the competi-
tion’s rules. See Figure 3 for visual examples of the aug-
mentations.
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Figure 3: A sample frame containing the various augmentations that were applied to the videos. Top row (from left to right):
original, brightness, contrast, a logo overlay. Second row: dog filter, dots overlay, faces overlay, and flower crown filter.
Third row: grayscale, horizontal flip, noise, and images overlay. Bottom row: shapes overlay, encoding quality level change,
rotation, and text overlay. Not pictured: blur, framerate change, audio removal, and resolution change.
4. Metrics
In most analyses of a machine learning model’s perfor-
mance, classification metrics such as log-loss are reported.
In certain settings, this type of metric may be appropriate.
For instance, a model trained to classify whether or not a
video is a Deepfake may have its input pre-filtered by ex-
perts who want to use the model’s score as an additional
piece of evidence when performing a forensic analysis on a
video.
However, in many other settings, especially those in
which an entity wants to find faked videos from a large set
of input videos, detection metrics are more appropriate. In
this case, it is important to create metrics that reflect the
true prevalence (or the percentage of true positives) of a
given type of fake video. In realistic distributions, the ratio
of Deepfaked videos to real videos may be less than one in
a million. With such an extreme class imbalance, accuracy
is not as relevant as the precision or false positive rate of a
model - the number of false positives of even an extremely
accurate model will outnumber the true positives, thus de-
creasing the utility of the detection model.
Weighted PR
If we assume that the ratio between Deepfake and unaltered
videos is 1 : x in organic traffic and 1 : y in a Deepfakes
dataset, it is likely that x  y. Given the large number
of true negatives, it is important for an automatic detection
model to be precise. Even a model with high accuracy will
detect many more false positives than true positives, sim-
ply because of the large class imbalance, which diminishes
the utility of a automatic detection model. Metrics like the
Fβ score (which does not weight false positives) or even
the false positive rate (which only measures the tradeoff be-
tween true negatives and false positives) do not capture this
issue. Instead, precision (or its inverse, the false discovery
rate) is the most indicative metric for how a detection model
will perform over a real distribution of videos. However, it
is not practical to construct a dataset that mimics the statis-
tics of organic traffic due to the sheer number of videos.
We can define a weighted precision for a Deepfakes
dataset as a very rough approximation of the precision that
would be computed by evaluating on a dataset equal in size
to the magnitude of organic traffic. Assuming the ratios of
unaltered to tampered videos differ between a test dataset
and organic traffic by a factor of α = x/y, we define
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Figure 4: The average log loss for each augmenter and distractor. As expected, videos containing the noise and faces
augmentations were among the most difficult to predict accurately. Surprisingly however, the flower filter, which only covers
a portion of the forehead, was the most difficult distractor while the dog filter, which covers the nose and mouth, was one of
the easier ones to predict. Horizontal flips, blurring, and rotation were among the easiest augmenters, likely due to the fact
that they are common data augmentations. Note that videos that contained both augmenters and distractors were excluded
from this analysis.
weighted precision wP and (standard) recall R as
wP =
TP
TP + αFP
, R =
TP
TP + FN
, (1)
where TP, FP, and FN signify true positives, false positives,
and false negatives. This metric differs from the Fβ score,
as it assigns a weight to false positives instead of false neg-
atives (and ignores true negatives). For an example applied
to submissions in the DFDC, see Figure 9.
For the purposes of ranking submissions in the DFDC
Competition, models were ranked by log loss, as the
weighted PR metric can be extremely small and somewhat
noisy. In addition, we only needed a relative measure of per-
formance to rank competitors, rather than an absolute mea-
sure. However, in Section 6, we report weighted PR metrics
in addition to log loss to assess each model’s performance
as a detector on a realistic distribution of videos.
5. Results
As we do not introduce any novel architectures, in this
section we describe how well different models and methods
perform in practice, and show some of the best and worst
examples of each method. Unlike other work in this area,
we explicitly do not show the worst examples from datasets
other than the DFDC Dataset as a comparison, as (a) it is
simple to cherry-pick the worst examples from a distribu-
tion of data produced by automatic methods, and (b) the per-
ceptual quality of a moving video cannot be demonstrated
with individual still frames. Instead, we believe that produc-
ing a very large dataset that covers a wide range of output
qualities and with many unique videos is more useful than
a hand-tuned, high-quality dataset of limited size.
In general, face swaps produced with DFAE methods
were of higher quality over a wider range of videos than
swaps produced with GAN-like methods, and required
much less fine tuning. Our hypothesis is that GAN-like
methods work well in limited settings with even light-
ing, such as news rooms, interviews, or controlled-capture
videos as in [14], but do not work well automatically (yet).
Beyond ease of use, this may explain why most public
Deepfake videos are produced with DFAE methods. Con-
sequently, the majority of videos in the DFDC Dataset were
produced with several different DFAE variants.
Some qualitative results from each method are shown in
Figure 5, with further discussion here.
MM/NN: While this method was able to produce con-
vincing single frame images, overall the NN approach
tended to produce discontinuities in the face. In addition,
there was sometimes a failure in the mask fitting, as seen in
the left image of the top row of Figure 5.
DFAE: The DFAE methods were generally the most
flexible and produced the best results out of the methods
included in this paper. They were able to handle a variety
of lighting conditions and individuals with good temporal
coherence, even though inference happened on a frame-by-
frame basis. Particular areas of weakness were glasses and
extreme poses.
FSGAN: The FSGAN was able to produce convinc-
ing results in scenes with good lighting, but struggled to
maintain an even skin tone in darker settings. In addition,
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Figure 5: A selection of results of varying quality, where each row corresponds to a method (from top-to-bottom, MM/NN,
DFAE, FSGAN, NTH, StyleGAN), and each column shows increasing quality from left to right. For a more detailed overview,
see Section 5.
it tended to produce flat-looking results. One particular
strength of this method is in handling extreme head poses,
as shown in the rightmost image of row 3 of Figure 5.
NTH: Of the GAN like methods, this method produced
the most consistent quality. However, it tended to in-
sert similar looking eyes across subjects, regardless of the
source ID. Like other GAN methods, NTH did not produce
good results in darker settings.
StyleGAN: Overall, StyleGAN produced the worst over-
all results, both at the frame level and at the video level.
By far the most common in issue in videos was an uncon-
strained eye gaze. Without conditioning on the input gaze,
the gaze of the swapped face tender to wander, with eyes
looking in different directions at once. In addition, Style-
GAN had trouble matching the illumination in a scene.
6. Large scale benchmarking
The second component of this work involved a large pub-
lic competition, where participants submitted Deepfake de-
tection models trained on the full DFDC Dataset. Initially,
the public test set was used to rank the public leaderboard
while the competition was ongoing. This set only con-
tained DFDC videos with subjects that never appeared in
the dataset. The ”private” test set included real videos, some
of which were Deepfakes, in addition to more DFDC videos
that contained even more subjects that hadn’t appeared in
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any previous set. Participants were free to use additional
external data, as long as it complied to the policies of the
competition.
The following analysis presents a comprehensive snap-
shot of the current performance of Deepfake detectors, and
in particular, the performance against the private test set
gives an idea as to how the best models would perform on a
real video distribution.
6.1. Meta analysis
During the course of the competition, 2,114 teams par-
ticipated. Teams were allowed to submit two different sub-
missions for final evaluation. Of all of the scores on the
private test set, 60% of submissions had a log loss lower
than or equal to 0.69, which is roughly the score if one were
to predict a probability of 0.5 for every video. As seen in
Figure 8, many submissions were simply random. Good
performance on the public test set correlated with good per-
formance on the private test set, as shown in the first image
of Figure 6.
Figure 6: Correlation between the average precision of sub-
mitted models for DFDC and real videos.
All final evaluations were performed on the private test
set, using a single V100 GPU. Submissions had to run over
all 10,000 videos in the private test set within 90 hours, but
most submissions finished evaluating all videos within 10
total hours, giving a rough average inference time of around
3.6s per-video.
6.2. Analysis of submitted models
After the competition ended, all scores for all submis-
sions were computed over all videos in the private test set.
Shown in Figure 7 are detection metrics computed over the
entire private set, only on videos from the DFDC, and only
on real videos. As expected, the best models achieved very
good detection performance on DFDC videos, as the all of
the videos in the training set came from this distribution.
On real videos, there was an expected performance drop,
but the best models achieved an average precision of 0.753
and a ROC-AUC score of 0.734, only on real videos, which
demonstrates that training on the DFDC Dataset allows a
model to generalize to real videos.
The second and third plots in figure 6 show the correla-
tion between detection metrics computed on DFDC videos
only and scores on real videos only, providing additional
evidence that good performance on the DFDC dataset trans-
lates to good performance on real videos, and consequently
that the DFDC dataset is a valuable resource for training
real Deepfake detection models.
Finally, we provide a brief description of the top-5 win-
ning solutions here - more detailed analysis of each ap-
proach can be found at the accompanying reference for
each model. The first submission, Selim Seferbekov [24],
used MTCNN [33] for face detection and an EfficientNet
B-7 [28] for feature encoding. Structured parts of faces
were dropped during training as a form of augmentation.
The second solution, WM [34], used the Xception [3] archi-
tecture for frame-by-frame feature extraction, and a WS-
DAN [12] model for augmentation. The third submission,
NTechLab [4], used an ensemble of EfficientNets in addition
to using the mixup [32] augmentation during training. The
fourth solution, Eighteen Years Old [25], used an ensemble
of frame and video models, including EfficientNet, Xcep-
tion, ResNet [10], and a SlowFast [8] video-based network.
In addition, they tailored a score fusion strategy specifically
for the DFDC dataset. Finally, the fifth winning solution,
The Medics [11], also used MTCNN for face detection, as
well as an ensemble of 7 models, 3 of which were 3D CNNs
(which performed better than temporal models), including
the I3D model [1].
7. Future work
There are three main areas of future work regarding the
DFDC Dataset. First, we would like to perform a large scale
perceptual study of the quality of the videos in the dataset.
Due to time constraints and extenuating circumstances sur-
rounding COVID-19, this portion of the project is delayed,
but is ongoing. Second, we would like to expand the overall
size of the dataset. Only 960 of the roughly 3,500 origi-
nal identities were included in the dataset, again due to time
and computational constraints. Finally, we are exploring
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Table 2: Top 5 model results - precision reported at recall levels 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9
Team name
Overall
log loss
DFDC
log loss
Real
log loss
Real
P@0.1
Real
P@0.5
Real
P@0.9
Selim Seferbekov [24] 0.4279 0.1983 0.6605 0.9803 0.7610 0.5389
WM [34] 0.4284 0.1787 0.6805 0.9294 0.6717 0.5775
NTechLab [4] 0.4345 0.1703 0.7039 0.9804 0.8244 0.5541
Eighteen Years Old [25] 0.4347 0.1882 0.6831 0.9843 0.6329 0.5625
The Medics [11] 0.4371 0.2157 0.6621 0.9653 0.7354 0.5516
Figure 7: Detection metrics broken down by video type.
the possibility of releasing the original raw dataset to the
research community. One of the main differences with pre-
vious Deepfake datasets is that they do not purport to have
agreement from individuals to be included in the datasets.
Releasing all of the roughly 50k 1 minute videos with some
additional annotations will help alleviate this problem, and
hopefully lead to even higher quality and larger Deepfake
datasets in the future.
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